The musings of a physician who served the community for over six decades
367 Topics
Downtown A discussion about downtown area in Philadelphia and connections from today with its historical past.
West of Broad A collection of articles about the area west of Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Delaware (State of) Originally the "lower counties" of Pennsylvania, and thus one of three Quaker colonies founded by William Penn, Delaware has developed its own set of traditions and history.
Religious Philadelphia William Penn wanted a colony with religious freedom. A considerable number, if not the majority, of American religious denominations were founded in this city. The main misconception about religious Philadelphia is that it is Quaker-dominated. But the broader misconception is that it is not Quaker-dominated.
Particular Sights to See:Center City Taxi drivers tell tourists that Center City is a "shining city on a hill". During the Industrial Era, the city almost urbanized out to the county line, and then retreated. Right now, the urban center is surrounded by a semi-deserted ring of former factories.
Philadelphia's Middle Urban Ring Philadelphia grew rapidly for seventy years after the Civil War, then gradually lost population. Skyscrapers drain population upwards, suburbs beckon outwards. The result: a ring around center city, mixed prosperous and dilapidated. Future in doubt.
Historical Motor Excursion North of Philadelphia The narrow waist of New Jersey was the upper border of William Penn's vast land holdings, and the outer edge of Quaker influence. In 1776-77, Lord Howe made this strip the main highway of his attempt to subjugate the Colonies.
Land Tour Around Delaware Bay Start in Philadelphia, take two days to tour around Delaware Bay. Down the New Jersey side to Cape May, ferry over to Lewes, tour up to Dover and New Castle, visit Winterthur, Longwood Gardens, Brandywine Battlefield and art museum, then back to Philadelphia. Try it!
Tourist Trips Around Philadelphia and the Quaker Colonies The states of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and southern New Jersey all belonged to William Penn the Quaker. He was the largest private landholder in American history. Using explicit directions, comprehensive touring of the Quaker Colonies takes seven full days. Local residents would need a couple dozen one-day trips to get up to speed.
Touring Philadelphia's Western Regions Philadelpia County had two hundred farms in 1950, but is now thickly settled in all directions. Western regions along the Schuylkill are still spread out somewhat; with many historic estates.
Up the King's High Way New Jersey has a narrow waistline, with New York harbor at one end, and Delaware Bay on the other. Traffic and history travelled the Kings Highway along this path between New York and Philadelphia.
Arch Street: from Sixth to Second When the large meeting house at Fourth and Arch was built, many Quakers moved their houses to the area. At that time, "North of Market" implied the Quaker region of town.
Up Market Street to Sixth and Walnut Millions of eye patients have been asked to read the passage from Franklin's autobiography, "I walked up Market Street, etc." which is commonly printed on eye-test cards. Here's your chance to do it.
Sixth and Walnut over to Broad and Sansom In 1751, the Pennsylvania Hospital at 8th and Spruce was 'way out in the country. Now it is in the center of a city, but the area still remains dominated by medical institutions.
Montgomery and Bucks Counties The Philadelphia metropolitan region has five Pennsylvania counties, four New Jersey counties, one northern county in the state of Delaware. Here are the four Pennsylvania suburban ones.
Northern Overland Escape Path of the Philadelphia Tories 1 of 1 (16) Grievances provoking the American Revolutionary War left many Philadelphians unprovoked. Loyalists often fled to Canada, especially Kingston, Ontario. Decades later the flow of dissidents reversed, Canadian anti-royalists taking refuge south of the border.
City Hall to Chestnut Hill There are lots of ways to go from City Hall to Chestnut Hill, including the train from Suburban Station, or from 11th and Market. This tour imagines your driving your car out the Ben Franklin Parkway to Kelly Drive, and then up the Wissahickon.
Philadelphia Reflections is a history of the area around Philadelphia, PA
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Philadelphia Revelations
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George R. Fisher, III, M.D.
Obituary
George R. Fisher, III, M.D.
Age: 97 of Philadelphia, formerly of Haddonfield
Dr. George Ross Fisher of Philadelphia died on March 9, 2023, surrounded by his loving family.
Born in 1925 in Erie, Pennsylvania, to two teachers, George and Margaret Fisher, he grew up in Pittsburgh, later attending The Lawrenceville School and Yale University (graduating early because of the war). He was very proud of the fact that he was the only person who ever graduated from Yale with a Bachelor of Science in English Literature. He attended Columbia University’s College of Physicians and Surgeons where he met the love of his life, fellow medical student, and future renowned Philadelphia radiologist Mary Stuart Blakely. While dating, they entertained themselves by dressing up in evening attire and crashing fancy Manhattan weddings. They married in 1950 and were each other’s true loves, mutual admirers, and life partners until Mary Stuart passed away in 2006. A Columbia faculty member wrote of him, “This young man’s personality is way off the beaten track, and cannot be evaluated by the customary methods.”
After training at the Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia where he was Chief Resident in Medicine, and spending a year at the NIH, he opened a practice in Endocrinology on Spruce Street where he practiced for sixty years. He also consulted regularly for the employees of Strawbridge and Clothier as well as the Hospital for the Mentally Retarded at Stockley, Delaware. He was beloved by his patients, his guiding philosophy being the adage, “Listen to your patient – he’s telling you his diagnosis.” His patients also told him their stories which gave him an education in all things Philadelphia, the city he passionately loved and which he went on to chronicle in this online blog. Many of these blogs were adapted into a history-oriented tour book, Philadelphia Revelations: Twenty Tours of the Delaware Valley.
He was a true Renaissance Man, interested in everything and everyone, remembering everything he read or heard in complete detail, and endowed with a penetrating intellect which cut to the heart of whatever was being discussed, whether it be medicine, history, literature, economics, investments, politics, science or even lawn care for his home in Haddonfield, NJ where he and his wife raised their four children. He was an “early adopter.” Memories of his children from the 1960s include being taken to visit his colleagues working on the UNIVAC computer at Penn; the air-mail version of the London Economist on the dining room table; and his work on developing a proprietary medical office software using Fortran. His dedication to patients and to his profession extended to his many years representing Pennsylvania to the American Medical Association.
After retiring from his practice in 2003, he started his pioneering “just-in-time” Ross & Perry publishing company, which printed more than 300 new and reprint titles, ranging from Flight Manual for the SR-71 Blackbird Spy Plane (his best seller!) to Terse Verse, a collection of a hundred mostly humorous haikus. He authored four books. In 2013 at age 88, he ran as a Republican for New Jersey Assemblyman for the 6th district (he lost).
A gregarious extrovert, he loved meeting his fellow Philadelphians well into his nineties at the Shakespeare Society, the Global Interdependence Center, the College of Physicians, the Right Angle Club, the Union League, the Haddonfield 65 Club, and the Franklin Inn. He faithfully attended Quaker Meeting in Haddonfield NJ for over 60 years. Later in life he was fortunate to be joined in his life, travels, and adventures by his dear friend Dr. Janice Gordon.
He passed away peacefully, held in the Light and surrounded by his family as they sang to him and read aloud the love letters that he and his wife penned throughout their courtship. In addition to his children – George, Miriam, Margaret, and Stuart – he leaves his three children-in-law, eight grandchildren, three great-grandchildren, and his younger brother, John.
A memorial service, followed by a reception, will be held at the Friends Meeting in Haddonfield New Jersey on April 1 at one in the afternoon. Memorial contributions may be sent to Haddonfield Friends Meeting, 47 Friends Avenue, Haddonfield, NJ 08033.
Mary Wirshup has a very different medical background from mine, but she's my kind of doctor. I couldn't help wishing, as she addressed our urban luncheon club, there could be thousands more like her, even while understanding more fully than she seems to, the reasons why doctors are driven from her behavior model. As we parted, it felt like saying a last goodbye to the Spartans marching to Thermopylae.
As 46,000 medically uninsured persons in Chester County get sickness and injuries, they know that a Federal Law prohibits a hospital accident room from refusing to see them, so ways are found to shunt patients to the CVIM free clinic, run by volunteers. This law is, in turn, a response to a government-created situation where a hospital which "accepts" patients must keep them. Any economics teacher can tell you that supply/demand issues are best addressed by price adjustment, so price controls in whatever guise lead to shortages. I must say I have little sympathy with the devious strategies which hospitals often employ to disguise their rejection of uninsured patients. At the same time, I know a lifeboat will sink if too many climbs aboard. Nevertheless, the semantic switch from lack of insurance to lack of care implies that only more insurance can surmount the barriers to care, which is absurd. For one thing, I know too many hospital administrators who are paid a million dollars a year, and one who is paid two million. And at least two health insurance executives are in the newspapers with a net worth over a billion -- yes, that's billion with a b. We have reached a point where reducing all physician income to zero would only reduce "healthcare" costs by 10%. As I look at Dr. Wirshup's modest clothing I can only surmise she plans to continue her modest living until she is 80 years old, after which her savings might see her out. Squeezing physician reimbursement is not intended to save significant money, nor intended to restore physician incomes to more equitable levels. It is intended to address the oversupply of physicians without confronting either the universities or the foreign trained lobby.
The elite tranche of medical schools do their part to relieve physician oversupply without reducing class size, through the encouragement of their students to go into research. I was well along at the National Institutes of Health before I finally decided I had not gone into medical school with that goal, and returned to teaching and patient care in a more satisfying model not too different from CVIM's obviously Pennsylvania Dutch spirit. The Amish at the far western end of Chester County reject the whole idea of insurance; their most characteristic statement is "Don't send me no bills." That attitude is rather a contrast with the shiny housing and automobiles in the Silicon Valley developments of Southern Chester County, or even with some rather bewildered Quaker farm families scattered over the rest of the county next to the horsey set. Chester County is America.
On Second Street in Society Hill, next to the park where William Penn's house stood and a few feet from Bookbinders, is the house of Dr. Thomas Bond. Bond conceived the idea of building the first hospital in America and with Franklin's publicity machine succeeded in getting it built, to care for the "sick poor". Dr. Bond started a second enduring tradition as well. When the Legislature expressed doubt that the institution was sustainable, he pledged to convince the local medical profession to serve the poor without charge. Some of the legislators who voted for the measure did so in the belief that charity care would never appear so the gesture would be without cost. The physicians did indeed come forward, in sufficient numbers to run many institutions for two hundred years. In 1965 health insurance made its national appearance and has regarded the benchmark low costs of charity care as a threat, ever since.
The Right Angle Club of Philadelphia recently heard two presentations on newer investment strategies, one by our member on hedge funds and private equity, and a week later by his guest from Black Rock, on ETF funds. For the purpose of this review, both presentations ultimately got around to the same issue.
In the case of private equity, the investor purchases a share of aggregated profits from a company in the business of buying a substantial or controlling interest in corporations, usually underpriced or underperforming ones. And then, the private equity fund attempts either to fix up the company and sell it or fix it up and hold it indefinitely. Whether or not he achieves a profit, the individual investor in the fund loses the opportunity to vote the shares, or has it offered in such an awkward way the opportunity is meaningless.
Hedge Fund
A hedge fund similarly buys and sells stock on its own account, employing the money of investors, and generally adding huge amounts of borrowed debt. In this case, the stock is often held for such short times that voting rights are lost in the registration requirements. Taken as a whole, however, the issue is substantial, since it is reported that 70% of recent transactions have been conducted by unattended computers operating by pre-arranged contingency instructions, often responding in fractions of a second. While the resulting immobilization of voting rights is substantial, the main problem with hedge funds has been the way very small profits have been magnified by staggering amounts of borrowing, potentially causing very large losses if the transaction system is slowed for whatever reason. While hedge funds did perform well during the 2007-2009 crash, it will be 2012 before the incredible volume of transactions can be analyzed to see how close we were to disaster. There is definitely a risk in doing nothing, but probably less than the risk of ill-informed legislation making matters worse in some way.
In the case of ETF, the operator or "manufacturer" of the fund attempts to buy blocks of stock in all or representative samples of the companies listed on some index, weighted in proportion to their weight in the index. The intent is never to sell that stock, merely evaluating the fund price and its dividends as a mathematical exercise, and repurchasing or reselling the calculated bundle to other investors, but never disturbing the contents of the bundle unless the index changes its composition.
In all third-party investing cases except hedge funds, the advantage is that reduced tax and transaction activity saves costs, and avoiding internal selling of stock means essentially no taxes are payable until the investor ultimately sells the fund. The managers of funds maintain that these tax and overhead savings completely compensate for losing whatever opportunities for profit would come along and be exploited by expensive "active" managing of the funds. (Some investment funds employ more Ph.D.'s than any American University does.) Even if the performance turns out to be somewhat lower, there is a safety factor of exactly matching the averages, and thus agreeing to surrender the opportunity to join half of the universe of investors in beating the average, in order to avoid joining the other half of investors in doing worse. Furthermore, distributing the investment over a large group of corporations confers diversification, and thus surrendering the chance of a windfall profit in return for avoiding the occasional disastrous loss. In a sense, the fund investor no longer hopes for a company to do well, he hopes for the whole nation to do well. Summarizing the details, these funds provide safety of diversification and reduction of turnover costs, in return for assured but marginal above-average performance. Since this outcome is so greatly superior to the actual experience of non-professional investors overall, it is highly attractive to many investors and should be attractive to more of them.
In addition to these common features, the hedge funds and private equity expose the investor to the risks and rewards of choosing a skillful manager, who may or may not choose the portfolio wisely, and who may or may not use leverage wisely. The choice of portfolio companies, on average, justify a greater degree of borrowing as their quality improves, and all investment borrowing involves a risk that interest rates may go up for reasons unrelated to the investment. In the recent debacle, hedge funds did comparatively well, but nevertheless, there are times when it is unwise to borrow against even the safest securities. And finally, because of the risk of stock market raids by outsiders, hedge funds are quite secretive about their portfolio contents and force the investor to "lock in" his illiquid investment for several years at a time.
There remains one characteristic of both funds, and for that matter mutual funds, annuities, life insurance and all other forms of aggregated investing through a third party. The third party retains the right to vote the shares, admittedly with some little-used and generally unworkable opportunities for investors to request their own proxies. Such third parties almost always vote the shares in their custody in favor of management. There are occasional exceptions, as when union-managed funds will vote their shares in a political manner, or as when some mutual funds attempt to obtain pension fund business in return for cooperation on selected proxies, or in one legendary story the custodian was instructed: "Always vote AGAINST any management proposal." But these are presently exceptional situations. In the vast majority of cases, the proxy votes effectively disappear, and control of the companies in the portfolio gradually gravitates into the hands of those few stockholders who retain direct ownership and take the trouble to vote it. In fact, it is increasingly the case that the most effective way to frustrate a management proposal is not to vote against it, but to abstain entirely, in the hope that a quorum cannot be assembled.
Another popular movement augments this unfortunate situation. Increasingly, it is urged that top management be paid substantial parts of its reimbursement by stock in the company or options on it. The argument is that it is important to align the motives of top management with the rest of the stockholders. Reflecting concern about some recent events, such stock is or should be forced to bear the covenant that it may not be voted in a stock take-over by an outside raider, to frustrate the commonly used inducement to the manager to sell out his stockholders in a merger. Even when this particular contingency has been foreseen and prevented, the effect of increasing the shares in the hand of management and decreasing the voting shares in the hand of the outside public by freezing them in third-party funds -- soon puts the idea in the heads of managers that they own the company. The recent public indignation about inordinately high salaries for top management, can in large part be traced to the plain fact that voting control of the companies is visibly shifting into the hands of the people who receive those salaries.
Two small sections, Eight and Nine of Article One, list the separations of state and national sovereignties in very sparing language. The states must be prevented from using their sovereignty to gain the advantage over each other. Defense of the coasts against piracy and a general postal system is a Federal responsibility. As are open borders between the states, both physical and economic, promoting trade to the advantage of everyone. Uniformity of weights and measures, patents and copyrights, currency and coinage, bankruptcy and naturalization rules permit everyone to aspire to wider and easier markets, without loopholes for weasels. Uniform rights unite the various subcultures, so a general prohibition of ex post facto laws and suspension of habeas corpuswas declared, along with degrading the currency, injuring the sanctity of contracts (or by implication injuring all the centuries of legal consensus known as the common law). Everyone knew state legislatures had either ignored or flouted these principles; state interference in these particulars was therefore expressly prohibited. Desirable federal powers were stated in a positive way, and limited to what was stated. However, because there remained doubters even after the Constitution was put into action, the Tenth Amendment was soon added to restate the point:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
These prohibitions were not put in there because they were theoretically possible. They were there because the sins described had happened many times, and the sinners agreed to them because denial was useless.
There were plenty of other negative ways to put all this, but the Constitution restrained itself. Certain powers were essential for a functioning national government, while some few powers would be destructive if the component states exercised them. The framers might have said but did not say: Look at what has happened among the little countries of Europe; the same thing might also happen to us. As Adam Smith had recently warned, avoid economic discriminations against foreigners which are lumped under the heading of Mercantilism; in other words, avoid the use of government power to favor local businesses against competitors outside the political boundaries who therefore have no local influence. Let several states avoid the expense and nuisance of different coinages, tariffs, licenses, and cartels. The inability to assemble parts of manufactures in different jurisdictions, using different rules and regulations, mainly designed to increase prices for the general mass of consumers for the benefit of a few politically well-placed producers, who should enjoy such advantages only if they earn them. In some ways, these negative arguments had the greatest persuasive force because almost everyone could think of some injury inflicted by similar laws. In 1787 it was only recently that our whole nation had suffered from the mercantile rules of Great Britain, who was supposedly a partner with the colonies. Exhortations with this sort of specificity were excluded from the document. Private publications like the Federalist Papers could be more explicit because they were not official parts of the agreement, and thus could be more easily reshaped by the courts. Those who today confine Original Intent to specifics could be treading on soft ground.
It was hard to know where to stop with these arguments. A promise was being made that the nation would prosper with expansions of scale, and in fact, it soon did. It was also foreseen that expansion of the right of the federal government to tax would automatically constrict the ability of the states to do so, and in time the state legislatures have been reduced to begging for federal funds. [At the same time, it seems unlikely that the Constitutional Convention would have condoned the present discordance between the several states in what federal taxes they pay compared with what federal benefits they receive.] The states' inability to levy troops and declare wars has indeed reduced local power to intervene to block hostilities, not of local concern. There have been occasions to fear that plebiscites for personal freedom may have sometimes impaired the nation's ability to defend itself. Local gasoline and cigarette tax wars occasionally spring up to exploit differences in state taxation, but in general, there remains comparatively little mercantilism at a state level. But regional differences have correspondingly grown, along with the sense of local powerlessness to resist it. The Civil War is only the largest example of a general trend of shifting conflicts into those gaps of jurisdiction unimagined by the framers. Section Eight arguments all rode on the rising tide of the Industrial Revolution; they proved in general to depict correct predictions. But they also persuaded 600,000 young men to die, for or against the Union itself.
There is scarcely any need to list the uncertainties of planning for retirement. To make a precise number, you would have to know how long you expect to live, how much you need to spend, how much cash flow is assured, how much your stock portfolio will be worth, what the rate of inflation will be, and so forth, and so forth. When you get done listing all the things you have to know, the general tendency is to assume the task is impossible. It's hard, but it isn't impossible if you know a single number: the average growth rate you need to achieve, if you are going to be in exactly the same financial position on your 100th birthday, as you are today. In my own case, the answer is 1.5%. I have arranged my own affairs in such a way that if my stock portfolio maintains a 1.5% growth rate until I reach my 100th birthday, it should be worth the same as it is today, on that happy occasion in the future. So, having the magic number of 1.5%, let's work with it. By the way, that's net, net -- net of inflation , net of taxes.
Inflation is supposed to be targeted by the Federal Reserve at 2% per year. It wouldn't be wise to count on that, but taken at face value, I can still break even if the nominal portfolio growth rate averages 3.5%, a conservative figure net of taxes. Remember however, you have to pay taxes on any taxable investment expenses. If you sell appreciated stock to have cash for portfolio re-balancing, you probably must pay capital gains taxes, if you take a lot of dividend income you will have to pay standard income taxes on it, if you get a new investment advisor who charges a lot you will probably have to pay him extra for his alleged expertise. In other words, if you get careless in your investment choices, you could find it will require an increased average growth rate, possibly one that is impossible to achieve. But that's your problem, which in my case is 1.5% plus actual inflation, plus investment carelessness about advisors and taxes. Or personal carelessness about housing costs, travel, fancy automobiles, or fancy friends. it means I could achieve a more likely growth rate of 4.5% a year, keep it up until I'm a hundred, and still be approximately where I am today. It seems achievable.
In fact, as you grow older it is less important to preserve every bit of your assets for the inheritance tax bite on the day you happen to die; particularly since inheritance taxes can go as high as 50%, and you can tell yourself you are spending fifty-cent dollars. Estate tax issues are not today's topic, however. For retirement planning, you could take the ancient advice to "spend your last dollar on the day you die." To entertain this illusion for a moment, you can see how much extra you could afford to spend, by dividing your assets by your life expectancy. You can consider that your safety net, but many people would have to consider it a reality, so this is the rough calculation. If you can't afford to retire on that amount, you probably can't afford to retire. This last calculation gets pretty inaccurate unless you are within five, or at most ten, years of retirement.
So all you need for scaring yourself, or sinking back into complacency, is to calculate that growth factor. Please remember the assumptions you made, in compiling it. Essentially, you total up a year's expenses and a year's income; and subtract to determine how much you are saving, or drawing down your reserves. It seems best to list all of the expenses and income on scratch paper, since at first you will want to go over the whole list to see if the year you picked was truly representative. The first step is to purify the list of one-time or odd-ball expenses and income. The second step is to pick out the expenses which are truly frivolous, which you would quickly eliminate in an emergency of some sort; what are the core expenses, what is truly frivolous, and what is desirable but expendable in a pinch. On the income side, there are pensions and annuities which assure you of cash flow, no matter what. There may be a job you plan to quit, or a pension which won't start for a few years. These are the tools you can use, but the main thing is to get that number, the amount could easily be saving, or the amount you must draw down your assets. Notice that we are essentially ignoring how much your assets happen to be, disregarding whether they happen to be a lucky high number, or an ominously small one. Your goal is to see how much you are either adding to them or subtracting from them; the purpose is to try to project where that will go in the future. In addition, you might also project the gain in your portfolio, but it would require several years to be certain about that, and for now we can get along without it.
Now, project that net gain (or loss) to your hundredth birthday. You may live longer than that, but it isn't likely; and you might live less than that, but you won't care if there is money left over for your estate. You might use a computer program to do it, but computers work by a process of "iteration", which means doing the same calculation, over and over again. For this simple purpose, it will suffice to do it with a pencil and paper, because the chances are good that you can project some future events which will interrupt the smooth flow of estimating one year's income from investment, and adding it to the running total. You soon get to 100, even using the crudest arithmetic, and you soon arrive at the net annual gain or loss in your portfolio at age 100, assuming the present rate of growth. If you do this for a few years, your projection will get more and more precise. You now take this number and re-calculate it with a differing growth rate of the portfolio. Start with 6%, and calculate up and down, 8%, then 4%, then 10%, then 2%, then 12%, etc. You vary the growth rate in a systematic way, and watch to see what growth rate of your portfolio will leave you at age 100, with exactly what you have, today. That's the magic number you want to get, the gross break-even growth rate. If it's a positive number, it tells you what growth you have to achieve in your portfolio, and if it's a negative number, it tells you how much you could afford to squander, you lucky person, over and above your present standard of living.
But now you have to see what could upset your applecart, like inflation. Our Federal Reserve has an announced target of 2% inflation, per year. If that happens, which I rather doubt, I need to add 2% to my 1.5%, getting a "real" target of 3.5% growth in my portfolio per year. That's an approximation of how much my portfolio has to grow, just to stay where it is. In my opinion it's achievable, but events may prove otherwise. Investments which promise less than 3.5% are for me not likely to seem safe, they are losers. Investments which pay more than 3.5% are likely to generate funds I cannot live to spend, so they will only generate inheritance costs approaching 50%. So in that happy case, I could consider giving some away, to my heirs, or charities, or whatnot. On the other hand, some young fellow who is projected to need a portfolio growth of 20%, had better consider getting an extra job, or cutting down his expenses--because the history of investments shows that 20% is either totally unachievable, or else involves so much risk that you better not gamble on it.
There's one other thing you can do if you are old, or sick. You can divide what you have by the number of years in your life expectancy, and spend it down. The goal is to spend the last dollar on the last day of your life. I hope everyone understands how unlikely you are to pull that stunt off, but sometimes it has to be considered. Somewhat more realistic is to adjust your life expectancy in this calculation, from 100 down to whatever age seems more likely. And maybe you have to reduce your lifestyle. Otherwise, your best salvation is not from an investment advisor, but from a social worker.
Try it out. Estimate your required net portfolio growth rate, and then add in "what if". What if the stock market collapses, what if inflation goes to 25%, what if social security gets reduced or increased, what if you suddenly acquire a new dependent. The older you are, and the longer you accumulate your own personal financial data, the more accurate the calculation will be. But at any age and in almost any financial circumstances, fixing your attention on that single number will be a North Star, to navigate by.
Twenty years after their Health Proposal was withdrawn from Congress in 1994, the Clintons can thank their lucky stars they withdrew it. One thing is clear; the Obama health insurance mandate followed a surprisingly similar early trajectory, beginning with a protracted flurry of publicity and astonishing promises that never materialized. But the Clinton plan was quietly sabotaged without much explanation before it got this far, nowadays almost pretending the subject had never been mentioned. In both cases, a President had proposed an adventure which the American public didn't want to undertake, but only one of them backed off.
As of this writing, the Affordable Care Act is a law actually in force, even though the party in opposition is determined to eliminate it as soon as it regains control, whereas the other party acts determined to conceal its real content for as long as it can. From its behavior, the Obama administration seems willing to provoke a Supreme Court contest, rather than conciliate a retreat. It seems unlikely the public will abandon its Constitution in order to preserve a health insurance plan, particularly when the President is running out of time to make it successful. Even if he could rescue a failing program, both foreign affairs and the financial crisis seem more urgently in need of his time and attention. We like to see signs of competitiveness in our President, but accomplishing what the Clintons, Harry Truman, and Theodore Roosevelt could not accomplish, does not strike most people as sufficiently useful. Some cynics feel his real strategy amounts to what they call in football, "playing for the breaks". Wait until your opponent makes a mistake. This book is written in the hope that both parties are as confused as they seem, remaining open to new ideas rather than rigidly following a playbook. Somewhere along a newer path, we might reset our compass to eliminating the disease as the route to reducing disease costs, instead of tinkering with insurance while we watch costs go up. For thousands of years, the elimination of disease has been an impossible dream. Not any more.
Let's begin with brief mentions of the Clinton Plan because it apparently set the original pattern. At its center was a national blueprint for Managed Care, called HMO (Health Management Organizations.) Leaders of large business, already intrigued by the notion of constraining national healthcare costs by clever management of the health insurance they provided their employees, had originally played along with the Clinton administration. As did their reluctant agents, the large-group health insurance companies. Together, Big Business and Big Insurance had previously taken a step away from state-regulated Blue Cross systems toward a nationally regulated ERISA system, in order to cross state lines more comfortably. Insurers were also having problems with their turf: the hospitals and the unions. Originally, hospitals had once, ninety years ago, joined with business to form locally based health insurance, often with small business and charitable foundations in the lead. However, insurance and the federal government eventually dominated (but underfunded) the health payment scene, with everybody unrealistically expecting business to pick up escalating costs that business could no longer control. And while business had to get along with its unions, it was disquieting to business leaders to find so much union influence infiltrating nonprofit insurance leadership. Hence they were uneasy to find so much interest in unionizing hospitals, so much involvement in partisan politics. Furthermore, the old actors were uneasy with the new actors looking for control, hence the subtle change of "medical care" into "health care", as a way of wig-wagging new allegiances. Finding a hospital-centered model increasingly worrisome, leaders of business had been briefly intrigued by the concept of shifting the control center to HMOs, which seemed to act more like businesses, and thus might be a better buffer with the feds. One of the main problems with dragging out major reforms over decades is that old alliances grow stale, old promises become invalid when new combatants join the battle. Gradually a number of disillusioned businesses quietly withdrew their support from the original Clinton proposal as they learned more of its new realities. In the view of the business and insurance world, national politics of some sort would soon cripple a complex HMO idea that needs good management, most of all. If the rest of the "health" world didn't feel it retained any debts to the pioneers of pre-paid health insurance, well, big business had other things to do.
Congressmen understood the general direction of this mixed message and, at least as defined by "HMO", the floor leaders of the Clinton Plan found they no longer had the votes to pass the health bill. The Clinton Administration yielded and let Big Business go it's a way. Businesses then undertook the HMO project themselves, only to get burnt fingers when they discovered the HMO concept, without a physician or patient enthusiasm, was doomed to failure no matter who co-sponsored it. The public, even their own employees, resented the regimentation of HMO systems, except perhaps for union political machines on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. To the interior of the country, the enduring California image of HMOs was not an asset.
Unfortunately, Democrats also escaped learning from Clinton cares flaws by failing to pass it. Most importantly, liberal leaders never quite grasped the message the public was sending back to them: The public's healthcare and its governance belong to us -- not to our employers, nor to our elected politicians. If some group wants to pay our bills for us, Americans would pocket the money. But ownership, transferring real ownership of healthcare to the public sector, had never been considered a serious option by a very large segment of the population. Local control was the main reason healthcare had lagged behind the rest of the economy in the shift from state to federal regulation. The debate was still about healthcare, but it might easily switch to a debate about the Constitution, which the Constitution was not likely to lose.
Powers not granted to the federal government...., are reserved to the States or the people.
Tenth Amendment: What Part Don't You Understand?
By 2008 under President Barack Obama, we had got used to the rise of foreign economies, but all economies narrowly escaped ruin. Probably because of the "Silo" effect on a full-time politician, our President seemed to think health insurance coverage was a bigger issue than the shaky economy. The biggest connection the rest of the public could see, between healthcare and the recession, was the cost of healthcare itself; even that was a stretch. Our uniquely American system was visibly successful in prolonging longevity in both our own country and indirectly in the rest of the world, but it seemed to require rising costs to sustain it. Many people, here and abroad, we're still catching up with increased health and longevity, but the American majority who had already achieved it had gone on to be worried about its insupportable cost. Because of his race, President Obama naturally appealed to the "catch-up" group; and because of their livelihoods, physicians were uncomfortable about complaining about costs. On the other hand, it is surprising to find a politician of President Obama's stature making the blunder of urging further immigration at a moment when it seemed questionable whether we could afford health "catch-up" for the population we already had. Physicians, who quite naturally favor more health care, were disillusioned early by the rationing device of Sustainable Growth Factor (SGR), now turned into a crude political blackmail scheme, one whose threat was discredited by Congress regularly postponing adjustments of frozen fees, year by year for decades. (To explain, SGR was an unrealistic cap on physician reimbursement which had reached the point of annually threatening a 26% cut in net physician reimbursement added to roughly 50% overhead costs. The prospect of shifting more control of Medicine to Washington was not enhanced by each year getting sympathetic treatment from Congressmen about SGR, but never getting it repealed. It was "like Lucy and the football".) The instinct for a compromise finally seemed to evaporate among physicians, when the Affordable Care Act was pushed through in one day without allowing amendments, in plain view of millions of citizens watching on television. A House of Representatives was forced to do a politician's bidding, suddenly acting like a South American dictator. For many physicians, America became a banana republic on that day.
The Tenth Amendment could suddenly be recited by people more characteristically excited by professional football. If there was to be the talk of amending the Constitution, perhaps it was the part about Congress making its own rules, which needed changing. State governments, ordinarily regarded as the weakest part of our political system, became a White Hope. Congress itself had become more polarized than at any time in the preceding fifty years. Not to mention the fragile condition of foreign affairs or the bewildering tangles of international monetary policy, it looked to be high time to ditch this health thing of Obama's.
Accordingly, this book roused itself into print. Because, no matter what the final fate of Obamacare, it isn't really healthcare reform, it isn't even serious health insurance reform. One main reason it deserves to raise so much concern is the way polarization is spreading into other basic institutions. A real danger is we may spend so much money, and devote so much of our limited attention span to Obamacare, that we never will get around to some basic reform of health care. No matter how else it may be described, this book is about real reform of health care, including absolutely indisputable reform of the insurance part. But because of the political timetable, I came to feel that there was only half the time I needed to be complete. I cut off the bibliography, had to be satisfied with a mechanical index, and then with great regret, cut out at least half of the "inside baseball" describing the details of healthcare reforms -- as distinguished from Health Reform. Unless this book provokes less controversy than I anticipate, there won't be time to do much but answer it.
George Ross Fisher, MD
Philadelphia
109 Volumes
Philadephia: America's Capital, 1774-1800 The Continental Congress met in Philadelphia from 1774 to 1788. Next, the new republic had its capital here from 1790 to 1800. Thoroughly Quaker Philadelphia was in the center of the founding twenty-five years when, and where, the enduring political institutions of America emerged.
Philadelphia: Decline and Fall (1900-2060) The world's richest industrial city in 1900, was defeated and dejected by 1950. Why? Digby Baltzell blamed it on the Quakers. Others blame the Erie Canal, and Andrew Jackson, or maybe Martin van Buren. Some say the city-county consolidation of 1858. Others blame the unions. We rather favor the decline of family business and the rise of the modern corporation in its place.